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Introduction 
In 1967 the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, published in book form a collection 
of texts he had been composing, under the title De la Grammatologie, Of 
Grammatology.1 The book was translated into English in 1974 by Gayatri Spivak and, 
with its one-hundred-page translator’s introduction, constituted the first major 
introduction to Derrida for English-speaking audiences. In 1985 an American 
professor of English Literature, Gregory Ulmer, published his engagement with 
Derrida under the title, Applied Grammatology: Post(e) Pedagogy from Jacques 
Derrida to Joseph Beuys.2 Ulmer’s investigation is one of the very few instances 
where Derrida’s mention of ‘grammatology’ is taken up at length. In July 2008, at the 
Derrida Today conference held at the University of Sydney, in Australia, the French 
Derrida scholar, Catherine Malabou, presented a key note address that probed the fate 
of Derrida’s notion of ‘grammatology’ and how its question might be re-engaged or 
re-invented today.3 By ‘grammatology,’ Derrida inferred a ‘science of writing,’ 
though an approach to the question of writing that radically engages with the question 
of science, of truth and of knowing. And if Ulmer activates the question posed by 
grammatology, it is in order to question a scene of teaching the radically questions 
writing as such. This paper aims at asking if the work of Derrida and Ulmer has 
continued relevance for a radicalising of the scene of teaching precisely by a critical 
engagement with what we commonly name as writing and what we commonly 
understand as its agency. 
 
 
The End of the Book 
 
The philosopher Jacques Derrida is perhaps best known for his invention of the notion 
of ‘deconstruction.’ Working in a philosophical tradition that engaged closely with 
the work of Martin Heidegger, Derrida significantly renovates Heidegger’s thinking 
with respect to two key Heideggerian terms: those of ‘destruction’ and ‘ontological 
difference.’ Both of theses are crucial for an overarching project of philosophy for 
Heidegger — that of ending the tradition of metaphysics in Western thought. Derrida, 
too, is concerned with the closure of Metaphysics, or with Heidegger’s understanding 
of that closure, as a task of philosophy. By ‘destruction,’ Heidegger infers a way of 
philosophising such that we secure ever more primordial engagements with the 
question of being, working through the errancy of Western metaphysics in order to 
reach the originary spring or leap into the question of what is. By ‘ontological 
difference’ Heidegger means that essential difference between beings that are in the 
world and the being of those beings. Indeed, metaphysics is inaugurated when this 
difference is forgotten and being itself is approached in an interrogation of beings that 
are rather than the being of those beings. Hence for Heidegger there is the intimate 
relation between the way of philosophising and the difference essential to being. 
 
Derrida radicalises Heideggerian ‘destruction’ in the term he invents, 
‘deconstruction.’ It too is a way of philosophising, though its approach to the question 
of origin will differ remarkably, and it too is engaged in a ‘deconstruction’ of the 
western metaphysical tradition. Derrida also radicalises Heidegger’s notion of 
difference, in the neologism, différance, which in a similar way confounds the 
originality of an originary distinction Heidegger would want to make between beings 
and being.4 Différance is the confluence of two primordial and essential abyssal 
relations with respect to any closure to meaning with respect to context: firstly, there 
is a radical openness in a spatialising of language such that meaning, the question of 
meaning, operates in an economy of differential relations that defer one to another in 
an infinite circuit of exchange; secondly, in that the question of meaning happens in 
plays of difference and never in the closed or saturated context of a transcendental 
signified, meaning, as saturated or closed is infinitely deferred. Différance refers to 
this crossing-over of a differing and deferring with respect to the production of 
meaning and with respect to the dissolution of a transcendentalism with respect to the 
finitude or self-certainty of metaphysics. 
 
Derrida has been most often engaged with for his contribution to a post-Heideggerian 
thinking with respect to the crucial terms of Heidegger’s philosophy, as well as for 
radicalising the project of philosophy with respect to its relations to literature, 
psychoanalysis and politics. As I mentioned above, one of the first Derrida texts to 
appear in English was Of Grammatology, which certainly had Heidegger in its sights, 
and it introduced a particular notion of writing under the term ‘Grammatology’ that 
would not resurface in Derrida’s latter corpus. Though we may recognise that during 
the 1970s in a series of publications Derrida not so much theorises but practices 
grammatologically as the invention of ways of writing that exemplify both 
deconstruction and différance. I am referring to his 1974 text Glas, the short text 
Cinders, and Envois, the preface to his study on Freud in The Post Card.5  
 
If we get a sense from what I have said above about Derrida’s approach to Heidegger, 
even if it is a vague sense, it has a particular emphasis on how the notion of origin is 
considered, indeed, how we question, philosophise or think without recourse to this 
notion as essential or fundamental to thinking as such. In Of Grammatology Derrida 
approaches the scene of writing from the vantage point of origins, in two senses that 
are both embedded in the metaphysical tradition and maintain Heidegger in that 
tradition. What are those two? Firstly, Derrida is able to emphasise that historico-
philological and philosophical investigations into writing invariably become stalled 
when they attempt to broach the question of the origin of writing in its emergence 
from primitive modes of inscription. The origin of writing as the emergence of the 
human from primitivism becomes not simply an undecidable and speculative task of 
history and anthropology, it becomes decisive in a secondary manner for 
differentiating the human from the non-human, the human from animality, for 
example.6 I emphasise in a secondary manner, because of that other emphasis Derrida 
gives in his approach to the question of writing.  
 
In the same year as the appearance of Of Grammatology, Derrida published another 
monograph titled Speech and Phenomena.7 Each of these texts refers to and relies on 
the other in some way. Together they present what is perhaps most essential in 
Derrida’s approach to the question of writing, in relation to it as secondary or 
supplementary to speech. Hence, essential to the western metaphysical tradition is the 
search for a ground, or essential nature such that knowing has its certainty and self-
certainty. Derrida emphasises from Plato to Husserl the privilege given to presence as 
this self-certainty, and the overwhelming emphasis given to the evidential nature of 
this presence in the self-presence of the voice to oneself, what Derrida termed phono-
centrism. In as much as language is constituted in the speaking self, language has its 
philosophical privilege in the voice, and constitutes writing as a supplement to 
speech, the secondary inscription of the voice. This Derrida terms logo-centrism. 
From Plato we find writing to be undecidably good and evil as that which destroys 
living speech and that which enables the transmission of what is said.8 As a techne, or 
technology, writing presents from the first the requirement of its own effacement in a 
semiology, from Aristotle on, that privileges the transcendental signified or meaning, 
over the play of signifiers or elements of inscription that necessarily exceed what may 
be voiced. If for Aristotle human being is the animal with language, and indeed 
Derrida has emphasised that the tradition from Aristotle to Heidegger has repeated 
this horizon, writing, for this speaking animal, will be its distinguishing techne, or 
essential technology that opens temporality to historicity and human being to 
anthropology. 
 
If Derrida’s encounter with the project of the closure of metaphysics engages a project 
of deconstruction, one of its key techniques, in its readings of the texts of philosophy 
is to recognise the hierarchical binaries that operate implicitly in those texts, as if they 
were natural, as if they were simply the exposition of truth, logos, logic. 
Deconstruction aims to locate the economy of the binary and its hierarchy, and 
crucially, avoid an inversion that would simply maintain the economy and hierarchy 
as such though invert the terms. Rather, Derrida aims to show how that economy 
unhinges itself, how the supposition of a natural standpoint is itself always already 
structured by the supplemental or secondary term. Hence, with respect to the 
requirement in the text of philosophy for the effacement of writing as the living 
presence of a text’s meaning, Derrida will emphasise the supplemental economy of 
writing as that which continually undoes the idealism of a transcendental signified 
and hence emphasises the disseminating play that writing inaugurates as material 
inscription and excess not reducible to presence or self-presence. In fact writing is 
precisely the presentation of the radical effacement of that self-presence, as the open 
possibility of text to meaning. This is necessarily a displacement of the ideality of an 
author-originator as arche or archeon as well as the teleological closure or certainty of 
meaning.  
 
In Of Grammatology, and in the context of deconstructing 18th century engagements 
with the origin of language in a natural primitivism, particularly with the work of J.J. 
Rousseau, Derrida will introduce the notion of the ‘dangerous supplement’ as that 
secondariness that radically destabilises the naturalised understanding of the truth of 
meaning or the essence of being. His engagement with or understanding of writing 
extends this dangerous supplement to displace the originary question of the being of 
beings in terms of a presentness in logos, in language, to a trace-structure of absence 
as an archi-ecriture, or originary writing the always already precedes and make 
possibly both speech and writing in their spacings and temporalisings, 
differing/deferring structures and difference one-to-the-other. And if the three cultures 
of the book, those of Greece, Judaism and Islam, had consolidated a Western tradition 
of thinking that itself cannot be though outside of the book, the phenomenon of the 
book, the technics and transmissibility, circulation and translation of the book, that 
book’s essential relation to truth cannot be separated from an onto-theology that 
essentially brings these three traditions together in their difference. The book is onto-
theological and in that cannot escape the transcendental as both its limit and moment 
of origin. It is in this sense that Derrida introduces grammatology precisely in terms 
of the end of the book and the beginning of writing.9 
 
The Scene of Teaching 
 
What, if anything, has this to do with tertiary students and issues around writing? 
Would not what I have been discussing be far removed from any here and now of a 
scene of learning or teaching? Would any activation of a concern with pedagogy, 
radical or conservative, be able to make use of this obscure philosophical thinking of 
Derrida’s concerned, it seems, with something essential to writing? In short, can we 
remotely consider an applied grammatology, one that sets about, systematically or 
haphazardly, using such an engagement with writing in the scene of learning? It is 
interesting that Derrida simultaneously published along with Speech & Phenomena 
and Of Grammatology, a collection of previously published essays, under the title 
Writing and Difference. Though writing appears in its title, and Derrida will engage 
with the radicality of deconstruction with respect to inscription and dissemination, as 
well as the question of the book within the western tradition, he will not again 
reference grammatology. Equally, in what followed, in Dissemination (1972), another 
collection of essays, Derrida maintains his sustained philosophico-critical engagement 
with meaning, language, inscription increasingly bringing into the free-play of the 
philosophical signifying chain the question of literature and psychoanalysis as each of 
these have undermined the naturalised functioning of the transcendental signified. 
Though no return to grammatology. 
 
Hence, it was with some surprise that in 1985 an American literary theorist, Gregory 
Ulmer produced a remarkable engagement with Derrida, precisely under the title 
Applied Grammatology. Ulmer had been teaching at the University of Florida (and 
still is) in the same department as one of the English translators of Derrida’s 1974 
extraordinary text Glas, a disseminating play of writing that moves between two 
columns of text, one a column on the German philosopher GWF Hegel and the other a 
column on the French writer Jean Genet. The editors produced a companion volume 
to their translation, titled Glassery, which provided a sustained and further 
disseminating play on the texts of Glas.10 Though philosophically erudite, and 
engaged in the closest of readings of Hegel and Genet, Derrida provides no footnotes 
or other referencing to the complex myriad of interweaving references he brings to his 
engagement. The text is excessive, obscene even, as academic writing. Ulmer was 
invited to contribute to Glassery, having initially encountered Of Grammatology 
while researching Rousseau, and in that encounter, deciding to become a scholar of 
Derrida rather than Rousseau. 
 
Ulmer distinguished sharply between the related though clearly different projects of 
deconstruction and grammatology, though this difference would be neither binary nor 
hierarchical, where either would serve as an originary moment for the derivative 
nature of the other. Ulmer suggests: 
 
The difference between Writing and deconstruction may 
be seen most clearly in the different ways Derrida treats 
philosophical works (which he deconstructs) and literary 
or artistic texts (which he mimes). The methodologies of 
the two instances here bear little resemblance to each 
other: the philosophical work is treated as an object of 
study, which is analytically articulated by locating and 
describing the gap or discontinuity separating what the 
work “says” (its conclusions and propositions) from what 
it “shows” or “displays” (its examples, data, the materials 
with which it, in turn, is working). Literary or plastic texts 
(a “new new novel” by Sollers, or drawings by Adami, for 
example) are not analysed but are adopted as models or 
tutors to be imitated, as generative forms for the 
production of another text.11  
 
An initial reception to Ulmer’s text by certain Derrida scholars suggested that Ulmer 
was committing the cardinal error of turning deconstruction into a method or 
methodology, something Derrida refused on a number of occasions, as method or 
methodology, in its reliance on logos understood precisely in the metaphysical 
tradition of presence, logic and linearity of temporal succession, would subsume his 
project as science in the broadest sense, with the inside-outside borders that this would 
entail as to the extent to which philosophy, literature and writing as such may be 
within or excluded from science understood as episteme. However, Ulmer was doing 
much more and much less than that, and a reading of ‘applied’ grammatology as the 
instrumentalising of Derrida would be missing the point entirely. 
 
Rather, Ulmer goes straight to the heart of the matter of episteme in engaging the 
scene of learning with the question of writing and in doing so undoes the naturalised 
hierarcheries that would differentiate the sciences and humanities, for example, with 
respect to the question of truth and the subject of truth. But more than this, Ulmer 
locks on to the inscriptable strata that constitute the layered ‘semes’ or seams of 
writing and meaning, the ‘picto-ideo-phonographic’ that Derrida identifies as his styles 
of writing. And crucially Ulmer introduces here, and significantly extends in 
subsequent monographs, the issue of the tele-technologies of circulation that constitute 
the ‘postal system of the letter’ constitutive of writing’s media. Thus in Teletheory and 
in Heuretics, Ulmer places increasing emphasis on the accelerated shifts in the late 20th 
century from literacy to ‘electracy’ to something that has to be encountered otherwise 
than as the substituted technics of a writing that has moved from hand-writing to 
machine writing, as if the nature of evolution and the naturalness of evolving 
technologies are able to maintain undisturbed the essential relation of writing to 
meaning. This is more fully explored in his 2003 text Internet Invention: From 
Literacy to Electracy.12 We would need to here emphasise the fundamental 
implications of deconstruction and grammatology with respect to Derrida’s ongoing 
and ethical question of the human in relation to the non-human, which implicates the 
differences understood between the natural and the artificial, between the living and 
the machine. A deconstruction of these binaries and recognition of the naturalised role 
of writing as a technical medium are central to concerns with grammatology, writing, 




Technology before the human 
 
It is the current pervasiveness of tele-technologies of internet circulation that need to 
become the focus of such a questioning. Internet modes constitute the ‘picto-ideo-
phonographic’ displacement of the linearity of alphabetic literacy. However, we need 
to recognise and research the extent to which this circulation of the scriptable 
constituted horizons for disclosing in grammatology not simply the plasticity that has 
always already inhabited the free play of signifiers restricted to the monolingualism of 
a transcendental signified, but more essentially and precisely as the disturbing 
artificiality of the natural, the always already intimate relation of the artificial, the 
technical, the supplemental, as that which enabled the possibility of naturalised 
meaning to emerge. This equally disturbs our understanding of the monocultural or 
essential understanding of author-originator, and opens the space for an econo-mimesis 
to displace the unified field of meaning always at question in logocentric engagements 
with writing. In terms of pedagogy and the discipline of writing or the writing of 
discipline, we may begin to recognise the extent to which the question of knowing 
may not reside in the restricted economy of the harnessing of language to the certainty 
of meaning, as if language is a tool transparent to the logical task of knowing. In this 
writing becomes the secondary and to-be-effaced medium of a wanting to say. Rather, 
we may recognise that what we considered an unassailable binary, the organic and the 
inorganic, the human and the machine, may have been the most naturalised of origins 
for thinking the human as rational animal, and the origin that grammatology as a 
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